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Abstract
In this Article, I will consider two general areas of the U.S. law of confidentiality. In Part
I, I will reflect briefly upon what I call “the U.S. culture of lawyer-client confidentiality.” I say
“culture” rather than “cult,” and one must guard against temptations to confuse those concepts.
Those reflections will serve as background—by way of both match and contrast—to my sketch of
the U.S. law of confidentiality in Part II.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike rock music and cola drinks, some peripatetic Amer-
icanisms do not get along particularly well in other cultures.
Some such dissonance is abroad in the world over the law of
client-lawyer confidentiality as it is applied in the United
States. I would like to begin to understand and appreciate that
dissonance.
I am not a comparativist and know little detail about the
workings of foreign legal systems and cultures.' Impelled by
those limitations, and not because of nasty insularity or lack of
intellectual interest, I must leave to more competent scholars
and practitioners the second step of any true comparison-an
appreciation of events and institutions far from these shores. I
look forward very much to discussion by others of develop-
ments such as the much-noticed 1982 decision of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities in AM & S Europe Ltd. v.
Commission.2 That decision stated two propositions that U.S.
lawyers in particular find troublesome, perhaps astonishing.
First, the Court refused to extend what U.S. lawyers would call
the attorney-client privilege (on the Continent, the nearest
English-language equivalent is "legal privilege") to communi-
* Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor, Cornell Law School. A version of this Ar-
ticle was presented at the Stein Institute of Law and Ethics Conference on the Inter-
nationalization of the Practice of Law at Fordham University School of Law on Octo-
ber 10, 1991.
1. A helpful beginning, examining the scope of the privilege in England and
other jurisdictions influenced by English and U.S. law, is D.F. Partlett, Attorney-Client
Privilege, Professions, and the Common Law Tradition, 10J. LEGAL PROF. 9 (1985).
2. Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, 1611, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264, 323 (profes-
sional privilege does not extend to lawyer who is "bound to his client by a relation-
ship of employment").
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cations with a corporate client's in-house lawyer. Second, the
Court stated that, in any event, communications would have to
involve a lawyer authorized to practice in, and thus subject to,
the professional rules of a European Economic Community
("EEC") jurisdiction before the Court would extend the attor-
ney-client privilege to communications involving such a law-
yer.4
By contrast, U.S. courts, in imposing numbers, have seem-
ingly well established the rule that house counsel functioning
as a lawyer (and not, for example, as a business adviser)5 quali-
fies as an appropriate participant with a client in a communica-
tion protected under the attorney-client privilege.6 In addi-
tion, U.S. law seems quite well settled that a legal practitioner
functioning as such in a foreign country qualifies as an "attor-
3. Id. at 1613, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 324.
4. Id.
5. The limitation that the lawyer must be functioning as a lawyer, and not in
another capacity such as business adviser, friend, escrow agent, or the like, applies
generally to all lawyers, whether house counsel or not. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 comment c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2]. Here and at other points, I will rely heavily on the Re-
statement, for which I serve as chief reporter. My views and interpretations, of course,
are personal and do not reflect policy of the American Law Institute, the organization
that sponsors the Restatement and that will ultimately approve or disapprove current
drafts of it.
6. E.g., Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Research Inst.
for Medicine & Chemistry, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 114 F.R.D.
672, 676 (W.D. Wis. 1986); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del.
1975). The point was assumed but apparently not argued or explicitly decided in the
well-known case Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981) (explicitly
referring to corporate client's general counsel as lawyer involved in communications
held to be privileged).
We stated this well-settled proposition in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
DRAFT No. 2, supra note 5, § 122 comment e ("[L]awyers function in that professional
capacity in many role[s], all of which are appropriate settings for application of the
privilege under this Section, including such roles as ... house counsel .... ); see also
id. reporters' note ("In-house counsel are professional legal advisers for purposes of
the privilege, whether locally admitted or not .....
The general legal acceptance of house counsel as "lawyer" finds expression on
the debit side of the ledger as well, although not without some ambivalence. Compare,
e.g., Florida Bar v. Weil, 575 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1991) (holding that admitted attorney
who served as house counsel during period of disciplinary suspension from practice
was "practicing law" and thus violating terms of suspension) with, e.g., In re Bar Ad-
mission of Crowe, 414 N.W.2d 41 (Wis. 1987)'(work as in-house counsel in state in
which lawyer -was not then admitted does not qualify as "practice of law" for pur-
poses of rule waiving bar examination requirement for lawyer previously engaged in
practice of law in another jurisdiction for period of years).
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ney" under the attorney-client privilege, whether or not the
person is admitted to a bar in the United States or, indeed, to
any bar.7 That result was almost inevitable in a federal polit-
ical system such as that of the United States. There is, in for-
mal terms, no such thing as a national bar. Lawyers are admit-
ted only in particular states. Lawyers who have gone to the
trouble to be admitted specifically in several states are re-
garded by their fellows and sisters somewhat as a state-fair tat-
tooed lady: the exercise seems more show than utility.' Thus,
7. E.g., Mitts & Merrill, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 112 F.R.D. 349, 352 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (involving German patent agent); Renfield Corp. v. E. R6my Martin & Co. S.A.,
98 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Del. 1982) (involving law-trained person functioning in ad-
vice-giving role of in-house counsel in France treated as lawyer for purpose of privi-
lege, despite fact that counsel was not eligible for admission to any French bar).
The federative character of the U.S. legal system and the consequent fact of sin-
gle-state admission has long since made it obvious that an attorney-client privilege
limited to locally admitted lawyers would be unwise. Whatever else might be said
about the operation of the privilege, surely it provides only a poor method of ex post
regulation of unauthorized practice by out-of-state lawyers. Catholicity also avoids
distracting and potentially thorny choice-of-law issues. See Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 503(a)(2) advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 238 (1972). At one
time, Rule 209(b) of the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) suggested a more restric-
tive rule. It would have required that a lawyer be authorized "to practice law in any
state or nation the law of which recognizes a privilege against disclosure of confiden-
tial communications between client and lawyer." See also UNIF. R. EVID. 26(3)(c)
(1953). That view has not survived in the United States, and it was removed in the
1974 reworking of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See UNIF. R. EvID. 502 (1974); see
also EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 88, at 324 (3d ed. 1984); JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(a)(2)[01]
(1989).
Judicial determinations of whether individual communications are protected by
the attorney-client privilege are often sufficiently complex and time-consuming with-
out the addition of foreign-law determination, complete with foreign-law expert wit-
nesses, which was necessitated by the older model evidence codes. The limitation
seemed designed to retaliate against non-U.S. legal systems that, presumably, un-
wisely refused to accept the U.S. conception of the privilege. That intent becomes
evident when it is realized that, under that discarded view, communications in the
United States by a U.S. client of such a foreign-admitted lawyer legally providing
legal services in the United States would, nonetheless, not be privileged.
8. Lawyers litigating in a state in which they are not locally admitted can, in
almost every state, obtain temporary local admission through an appearance pro hac
vice. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.4.3 (1986). On admis-
sion pro hac vice in federal courts, see id. § .15.2.4. Frankly, lawyers conducting trans-
actional work ignore state lines; so long as they are admitted in the jurisdiction in
which they have an office and regularly practice, most U.S. lawyers feel entirely unen-
cumbered in crossing state lines to confer, advise, negotiate, and take other steps on
behalf of clients in states where they are not admitted.
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it is familiar and congenial to U.S. courts to think of "foreign-
admitted" lawyers as, nonetheless, lawyers in all respects.
Instead of venturing off-shore to understand and critique
such developments from a comparative perspective, I will stay
close to my home port in my own discussion. In this Article, I
will consider two general areas of the U.S. law of confidential-
ity. In Part I, I will reflect briefly upon what I call "the U.S.
culture of lawyer-client confidentiality." I say "culture" rather
than "cult," and one must guard against temptations to con-
fuse those concepts. Those reflections will serve as back-
ground-by way of both match and contrast-to my sketch of
the U.S. law of confidentiality in Part II.
Despite my inability to supply a fully comparative perspec-
tive, I hope that consideration of these selected topics sheds
some light on the challenge of lawyer confidentiality in interna-
tional law practice. Although a comparative perspective must
be completed by others, such a review of the U.S. law of confi-
dentiality may help to set it into sharper relief. What I attempt
to supply here is the perspective that can sometimes be
brought to an examination of a country's law by one from an-
other shore, a view that attempts to proceed without precon-
ception or pre-commitment to approve or disapprove. I in-
tend to attempt that here, or at least with as little preconcep-
tion as a scholar can muster on a familiar subject.
I. THE U.S. CULTURE OF LA WYER-CLIENT
CONFIDENTIALITY
The U.S. culture of lawyer-client confidentiality derives
largely from rhetoric about lawyer-client confidentiality and is
thus a figment of the strong U.S. legal imagination. The rheto-
ric is consistent among speakers and over time. It also pur-
ports to provide a program of action, and thus it seems to re-
flect an ideology. It is radical in the sense that the ideology is
avowedly non-pragmatic: proponents vigorously insist on ab-
solute adherence to it, regardless of sacrifice of competing in-
terests. It is radical in a second, core sense as well: the ideol-
ogy is thought to be central and vital to broader visions, such
as that of a just society.
My impression is that the rhetoric of client confidentiality
derives from a broader and deeper tradition of U.S. legal radi-
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calism. That tradition has been pervasive through the U.S.'s
relatively brief social history. The broad strain of radical U.S.
legal rhetoric stretches from at least the colonial rhetoric of'
Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams, through Clarence Darrow,
and to Ramsey Clark, William Kunstler, and Ralph Nader.9 At
times, although radical, this strain of rhetoric has dominated
public discussion about some legal issues. The rhetoric is
bold, visionary, and resonant with many basic U.S. political
and legal themes of a broad sort. These qualities permit it to
travel comfortably and sometimes in high style in popular cir-
cles, and sometimes to gain strong, if momentary, journalistic
appeal. I would place much of what the popular press carries
about client confidentiality in this category of radical U.S. legal
rhetoric. I will also leave partly at the level of assertion the
statement that the U.S. culture of client confidentiality is rhe-
torical and thus a figment of the public legal imagination. We
will also see shortly that there is at least substantial verbal con-
trast between the claim of the imagination and the reality of
the law.
Perhaps the best, and at least the most pithy, way of illus-
trating the culture of confidentiality is through one of its very
occasional official utterances. The example also indicates how
occasionally rhetoric, even of a radical kind, can be translated
into a kind of official state policy. Here, as I will shortly indi-
cate, the policy statement has an interesting international twist.
I have in mind the well-known, but curious, California statute
that some people, mistakenly, have understood to describe
that state's law of the attorney-client privilege-section
9. I list here only what I might term "public" radicals-those whose careers
brought and bring them prominently and recurrently into the public eye. They have
thus played occasionally important roles in U.S. social and political history. Also
important in a survey of U.S. legal radicalism, which this Article is not, are the
"quiet" radicals-intellectuals and writers who are much less widely known, such as
Umberto Unger and other members of the Critical Legal Studies movement in the
United States today. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 5.2 & n.76. Because U.S. politics
by and large distrusts and ignores intellectuals, the careers of quiet radicals are
played out only in the course of intellectual history. The two schools of legal radicals
thus largely ignore each other, although they often share common enemies and some
portions of program. I am not aware, however, of any quiet radical who takes the
extreme view of client confidentiality that I find in the public radicals. To the con-
trary, some modern quiet radicals are deeply distrustful. of the anti-social conse-
quences of confidentiality. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Proce-
dural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wisc. L. REV. 29.
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6068(e) of the California Business and Professions Code.'"
The statute at one time simply recited the words of a lawyer's
oath, a list of tasks that a lawyer about to be admitted to prac
tice in California swore to perform. Among other duties, a
lawyer in California, according to the statute, agrees to bear
the heavy responsibility "to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets,
of his or her client.""'
Subsection 6068(e) has a lineage, ancient for California,
with an international turn. Its predecessor (from which the
subsection does not substantially differ) was first enacted in
California in 1872, early in its statehood. It was lifted without
alteration from section 511 of the original "Field" code of New
York.' 2 The New York commissioners' notes claim that the
language was translated from the statutorily prescribed oath of
advocates in the Canton of Geneva.' 3 In the new regulatory
era, section 6068(e) gained greater prominence after 1989 as a
sort of required supplement to the California lawyers code.
Unique among the states, California's lawyers code' 4 does not
contain any direct requirement of confidentiality. That and
similar omissions are covered in code form only by the duties
specified in section 6068. By explicit reference in the lawyers
10. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1992). Section 6068(e)
states in part: "It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: . . . (e) To
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve
the secrets, of his or her client." Id. In fact, the California attorney-client privilege
provisions are found in sections 950 through 962 of the CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE
(West 1966).
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1992).
12. See Report of the Commissions on Practice and Pleadings, Code of Civil Pro-
cedure 204-05 (1850) [hereinafter New York Commissions Report]. The copying can
readily be explained by the remarkable coast-to-coast influence of the Field brothers,
who were originally from New York. The author of the New York Code of Civil
Procedure (which, among other ironies, was never enacted in New York as drafted)
was David Dudley Field. His brother, Stephen J. Field, the future governor of Cali-
fornia and associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was then an influential mem-
ber of the judiciary committee in the legislature of California. Stephen J. Field was
responsible for guiding through it the present section of the modern California code,
along with much of its procedural law, using the New York code as a model. See CARL
B. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 54-55 (1969).
13. New York Commissions Report, supra note 12, at 205.
14. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, CAL.
CIV. & CRIM., PROF. RULES pt. 2 (West Supp. 1992) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA RULES].
The California Rules were approved by the California Supreme Court on November
28, 1988 and became effective on May 27, 1989. Id.
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code, that and other prescriptions also bind California lawyers
for disciplinary purposes. 5 California lawyers thus practice
under a hybrid system of regulation-part enacted by the state
legislature and part promulgated by the California Supreme
Court. 16
Three elements in the language of section 6068(e), por-
traying both its mythic and its radical-heroic qualities, are im-
mediately relevant. First, the statute's protection of client con-
fidences is absolute. Nothing is said in the statute about ac-
commodating other interests through exceptions, of
occasionally setting aside the demands of client confidentiality
in order to give heed to what may on occasion be a superior
legal interest.' 7 Second, the client's interest is stated in terms
that strongly imply that the lawyer is personally at risk in pro-
tecting it, and properly so as a consequence of the lawyer's
calling. Third, and following from the prior points, the statute
15. See id. Rule 1-100(A) ("The prohibition of certain conduct in these rules is
not exclusive. Members are also bound by applicable law including the State Bar Act
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6000 et seq.) and opinions of California Courts."). The pre-
1989 California lawyers code did not contain a similarly specific incorporation-by-
reference of the State Bar Act. See RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 1-100 (West 1981) ("Nothing in these rules is intended to
limit or supersede any provision of law relating to the duties and obligations of attor-
neys or the consequences of a violation thereof.").
16. On the customary unwillingness of U.S. courts, including the California
Supreme Court (on other issues that are analytically indistinguishable), to permit the
state legislature to interfere, even in benign ways, with the power of the judicial
branch to regulate lawyers, see generally WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 2.2.3.
17. Take, for example, a lawyer's suit against a client to recover fees for legal
services. Such suits are permissible in California, despite the fact that most fee suits
would be difficult to the point of impossibility to reconcile with section 6068(e). The
way out is found only in California case law-opinions holding that the confidential-
ity obligation does not apply to reasonable use of confidential client information to
recover a fee. E.g., Henshall v. Coburn, 169 P. 1014 (Cal. 1917) (permitting Lawyer
2, suing purported clients for fee, to elicit from Lawyer 1, to whom clients had first
gone for legal services, confidential client communications concerning whether to
involve Lawyer 2 in representation). In contrast, the extravagantly hurtful use of
confidential client information to collect a fee is subject to discipline. E.g., Linden-
baum v. State Bar of Calif., 160 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1945) (disciplining lawyer for writing
letter to immigration service office to incite investigation of client's wife after client
listed lawyer's fee bill as scheduled debt in bankruptcy).
Such a superogatory role for decisional law is hinted at in Rule 1-100 of the
California Rules. See CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 14, Rule 1-100 ("Members [of
the mandatory state bar] are also bound by ... opinions of California courts."). Suf-
fice it to say that "bound by" obscures, to say the least, the point that a duty that
otherwise would exist under mandatory legislation is being relaxed by courts through
the decisional process.
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directs lawyers always to subordinate their personal interests,
to those of the client. In that sense the statute is strongly hier-
archical.
I think we will see that the implicit legal claims of the Cali-
fornia statute are mythological: in California as elsewhere,
each of the three propositions is either dead wrong or subject
to serious compromise. Only very occasionally has anyone in a
position of responsibility read the statute literally. In one re-
markable concurring opinion in a 1954 case, two California ap-
pellate judges did assert that a lawyer was required by section
6068(e) always to refuse to comply with a direct court order to
testify after the lawyer had invoked the attorney-client privi-
lege and the trial court had held that the privilege did not ap-
ply!' 8 The purpose of such invariable intransigence was to in-
cur a contempt sanction in order to obtain the procedural basis
for the lawyer's immediate appellate review. No subsequent
California opinion or any other authority supports such a mon-
strous requirement. The interesting point is that at least on
that isolated occasion, the extravagant rhetoric of section
6068(e) was mistakenly thought to prescribe a straightforward
legal rule. One point to be made, I suggest, is that even the
use of ceremonious and flamboyant language in an otherwise
innocuous source such as an oath of office can be rendered
dangerous if read literally.
As the next illustration of the U.S. culture of client confi-
dentiality, I turn to the writing of a contemporary scholar. The
assuredly most eloquent and long-persisting defender of radi-
cal confidentiality is Professor Monroe H. Freedman of the
Hofstra University School of Law. His early adventures in this
subject deserve to be better known than they are, because they
show true lawyer heroism in the face of threatened lawyer mar-
tyrdom.' 9 In 1966, Professor Freedman had already estab-
18. People v. Kor, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (Shinn,J., concurring).
With equal intemperance, I have elsewhere dismissed the talk in the opinion as "judi-
cial heavy breathing." WOLFRAM, supra note 8, at 254 n.79. For a much more fine-
tuned and discerning examination of the connections between the "secrets and confi-
dences" statute and a state's attorney-client privilege, in a jurisdiction that had cop-
ied, in turn, the California oath statute, see State v. Keenan, 771 P.2d 244 (Or. 1989).
19. For a brief account of how Professor Freedman's speech brought upon him
an ultimately unsuccessful disbarment campaign by several District of Columbia fed-
eral district judges, see Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809,
824-25 n.54 (1977).
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lished a reputation as a rising legal scholar and civil libertarian
when he gave a lecture to criminal defense lawyers in the Dis-
trict of Columbia on what he called "the three hardest ques-
tions" in criminal defense practice: whether to cross-examine
a witness known by the lawyer to be telling the truth, whether
to ask a question of a testifying client-defendant when the law-
yer knows that the answer will be perjurious, and whether to
advise a client about the legal implications of testimony when
preparing the client to testify as a witness. 20
On the second question, which is most germane to my
topic, Professor Freedman's radical answer was that a lawyer
not only may but must ask the appropriate questions to guide
the client through the perjurious exercise in a way that permits
the client to tell the client's false story to the jury as the client
wishes to tell it.21 Professor Freedman urged that position not
at all because he relished falsehood or believed that lawyers
could not be asked to detect it,22 but for the logically intelligi-
ble reason that any other course would compromise the cli-
ent's interest in confidentiality. As Professor Freedman would
later put it, the problem of client perjury presents a criminal
defense lawyer with a "trilemma. ' ' 23 First, a lawyer cannot pro-
vide competent legal assistance without knowing all the facts
that the client knows and is able to tell the lawyer.24 Second,
20. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Law-
yer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). See generally MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
21. Freedman, supra note 20, at 1475.
22. On Professor Freedman's agony over the extent to which his position entails
complicity in presenting false testimony, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS 121 (1990). One important contribution of Professor Freedman's
early writing was to explore a central question of epistemology entailed in any claim
to take seriously the question of client perjury. To do so requires that we posit that a
lawyer will in some circumstances "know" of the perjury. Many lawyers who deny
that the question presents a real issue do so on the ground that a lawyer never
"knows" that a client will testify falsely. E.g., Panel Discussion, Professional Responsibil-
ity in the Practice of Criminal Law (remarks of Richard Uviller), in PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY OF THE LAWYER: THE MURKY DIVIDE BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG 49, 56
(Nina M. Galston ed., 1976). Professor Freedman disagrees, arguing that lawyers
often know of truth or falsity in a client's testimony. See FREEDMAN, supra, app. B; see
also FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 51-58.
23. E.g., FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 22, ch. 6
("The Perjury Trilemma").
24. Id. at 111.
1991-1992]
538 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.15:529
the lawyer must hold "in strictest confidence ' 25 all communi-
cations by the client to the lawyer.26 And third, in presenting a
matter to a court, a criminal defense lawyer must act with can-
dor.27 Professor Freedman's solution to the quandary was to
give preeminence to the interests of competent representation
and client confidentiality and to sacrifice to that extent the in-
terest in sustaining the truth-determining. function of trials.28
Although radical at the time; Professor Freedman's force-
ful statement of his position almost single-handedly get in train
a debate that has gripped professional and scholarly attention
for the better part of three decades.2 ' That debate has begun
to subside only in recent years. 30 Professor Freedman's con-
ception of the reach of confidentiality articulated the view of a
sizable segment of U.S. professional opinion, striking the same
resonant chord that we see reverberating in the California stat-
ute. I say "a sizable segment" of professional opinion, but I do
not say a majority. In the debate that ensued after Professor
Freedman's views were first published in 1966, lawyers from
three rather disparate groups have joined the Freedman side
of the debate at least some of the time: criminal defense law-
yers, personal injury claimants' lawyers, 3 ' and, although in a
25. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 27.
26. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 22, at Il1.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 109.
29. For contemporary responses, see, for example, David G. Bress, Professional
Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1493,
1495-96 (1966); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confiden-
tiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1966).
30. Neither bench nor bar ultimately accepted Professor Freedman's thesis on
presenting false client testimony. The opinion that has had the most influence-
surprisingly, because of its uninspired reasoning-is Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,
170-71 (1986) (dicta) (stating that lawyer who knows of client's intent to commit per-
jury at criminal trial must not participate in presenting it). Of greater importance,
and influential in Nix v. Whiteside itself, was the rejection by the American Bar Associa-
tion of Professor Freedman's thesis in formulating what became Rule 3.3(a)(4) of the
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. The rule states that a "lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes
to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." See id.
Rule 3.3 (a)(4); see also id. comment (stating that "the rule generally recognized is
that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence of
the client's deception to the court or to the other party").
31. The position of the personal-injury claimants' bar has been most explicitly
articulated. In a document drafted, not surprisingly, by Professor Freedman, the As-
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much more guarded form, some corporate lawyers. The ma-
jority of lawyers, and certainly a very large majority of U.S. law-
yers-the bulk of whom are office lawyers who rarely or never
go to court-sat out the debate, either too confused by the
contentious discussion, too ill-informed of its doctrinal impli-
cations to take sides, or, though sympathetic to Professor
Freedman's position, too discomfited by its radicalism to wish
to be personally associated with it.
For our purposes, the most salient feature of the Freed-
man school of confidentiality is hot that it has found little suc-
cess in courts or other official fora. Despite that lack of ulti-
mate official acceptance, it has provided a theoretical basis for
those articulate and well-situated lawyers who argue in favor of
a very broad reach of client confidentiality. This basis is
founded on the client's interest in obtaining effective legal
services through fully-informed counsel, and the client's inter-
est in autonomy through being able to resist the state and
others, s2 with the skilled assistance of a lawyer who is sworn to
both fidelity and secrecy.
Let me close this section of my discussion with reflections
on causes. How is it possible that a view such as Monroe
Freedman's could be so widely acclaimed and exuberantly cel-
ebrated despite its rather dismal record of official acceptance?
The answer to that question, I think, takes us closer to the
mother lode of U.S. legal culture. What is intuitively appealing
sociation of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA") put forward a proposed code of
lawyers' conduct that would have put Professor Freedman's view into the form of a
disciplinary requirement. See RoscoE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF
CONDUCT, ch. 1, illus. l(i) & 1(j) (rev. draft 1982). See generally Charles W. Wolfram,
Client Perjury: The Kutak Commission and the Association of Trial Lawyers on Lawyers, Lying
Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 964.
32. I speak of "others" because advocates of Professor Freedman's thesis origi-
nally put it forward as a special justification for assisting a person accused of a serious
crime-thus invoking, at least implicitly, the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. Those provisions are applicable, of course, only with
respect to criminal proceedings. The thesis has become generalized, however, in
Professor Freedman's hands. Although I have found no place where he has defended
the position, he has applied it-without further justification-to civil litigants as well
as to corporate clients, who have no Fifth Amendment privilege. The ultimate exten-
sion occurred in Professor Freedman's ATLA proposed lawyers code, where no dis-
tinction was drawn between the types of testimonial settings in which the client per-
jury occurred. See supra note 31.
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about Professor Freedman's approach to confidentiality is that
it calls upon that most American of pop-jurisprudential rally-
ing cries-the invocation of rights. (It also shares a quality for
which lawyers of all stripes frequently call-sharp clarity and
ease of application. To paraphrase a noted legal philoso-
pher,"3 a formulation that purports to provide easy answers to
difficult questions should be immediately suspect as simple-
minded.) Several observers of popular and scholarly legal dis-
course in the United States have been making the point in re-
cent years that our jurisprudence is often dominated by a
rights-compulsive, selfish view of the world.34 If one has a
"right," then all else and all others must step aside and allow
the right to be exercised in any way that the right-holder may
wish. In this view, the fact that exercising the right tramples on
the interests of others, even on important community interests,
is not criticism but description. As the California confidential-
ity statute loftily puts it, the client has a right of confidentiality
"at every peril"35 to the lawyer. As was true of the rights
revolution in criminal procedure in the heyday of the U.S.
Supreme Court under ChiefJustice Earl Warren, embracing or
rejecting the expansion of the procedural rights of accused
persons boils down to a choice between giving ascendancy to
the interests of nearly perfect criminal process (for a host of
arguable reasons) or giving preference to the community inter-
est in effective law enforcement (for a host of different rea-
sons). What the U.S. legal culture strongly implies, and what
the rhetoric of U.S. legal radicalism often encourages one to
believe, is that a similar choice must be made with respect to
client confidentiality. The client's "right" to confidentiality
must be respected above all other interests-without compro-
mise, and without accommodation.
II. THE U.S. LA W OF CONFIDENTIALITY
What in fact is going on with the U.S. law of confidential-
33. David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections
to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424, 433 (1990). Professor Luban, I hasten to
add, was referring not to Professor Freedman's perjury test, but to a prior position of
his own on a point not involving perjury.
34. The point has been made most recently by Professor Mary Ann Glendon in
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIscouRSE (1991).
35. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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ity? Let me begin by briefly describing the sorts of legal doc-
trines that a U.S. lawyer has in mind in referring generally to
"client confidentiality." We have had occasion to traverse
most of this domain in the initial stages of drafting the Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers (the "Restatement").3 6 Three
key doctrines are involved. I will then turn to a discussion of
several illustrations that will help us compare the law of confi-
dentiality with what we would expect the law to be given the
U.S. myth of client confidentiality.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
First, and perhaps most familiar, is the attorney-client
privilege. The general concept is set out in section 118 of the
Restatement, and then elaborated upon in the following sec-
tions. The four-fold definition of the privilege is sketched
there as follows:
§ 118. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Except as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the
attorney-client privilege may be invoked as provided in
§ 135 with respect to:
(1) A communication
(2) Made between privileged persons
(3) In confidence
(4) For the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client.37
In "restating" the privilege, we restate a doctrine that is a
rule of the law of evidence. Technically, it is confined in appli-
cation to evidence questions that arise in the course of civil and
criminal court proceedings. 38 As such, the privilege limits the
extent to which a party in litigation can force from an unwill-
36. See supra note 5.
37. See RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 2, supra note 5, § 118. Sections that follow sec-
tion 118 expand upon and explore each of the four key components. Section 119
examines communications covered by the privilege. Section 120 describes privileged
persons. Section 121 defines "in confidence." Finally, section 122 examines the re-
quirement that legal assistance be the object of a privileged communication. See id.
§§ 119-122. Further sections examine the privilege as it applies to organizational
and multiple clients, duration of the privilege, waivers and exceptions to it, and the
process of invoking the privilege and its exceptions. Id. §§ 123-135.
38. The privilege has a less certain application in other tribunals such as in ad-
ministrative and legislative hearing bodies, because those tribunals are often unclear
as to the extent to which formal rules of evidence apply.
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ing witness a statement or document that is protected as confi-
dential. It does not independently supply the basis on which it
can be claimed that a lawyer is required to invoke the privilege
or, out of court, to keep client information confidential. Other
law, discussed later, supplies that basis. The privilege attaches
to any communication if, roughly speaking, it was generated in
confidence by either the lawyer3 9 or the client in the course of
a lawyer-client interchange. That which a client communicates
to a lawyer under those conditions is subject to the privilege;
and, in most jurisdictions, that which a lawyer communicates to
a client is equally privileged.
B. Lawyer Work-Product Immunity"
The second general doctrine is, I strongly suspect, partic-
ularly confusing to non-U.S. legal observers-or, for that mat-
ter, to a highly perceptive U.S. non-lawyer. It certainly befud-
dles first-year U.S. law students. The doctrine carries various
labels,4 but is most commonly referred to as work-product im-
munity. Lawyer work-product is best understood as a broad-
ened but flattened version of the attorney-client privilege.42 It
39. On the application of the privilege to lawyer-initiated communications, such
as a lawyer's confidential opinion letter to a client, see RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2,
supra note 5, § 119 comment i & reporters' note.
40. I will here refer to "lawyer" work-product because lawyers are my focus. It
should be noted, however, that most versions of the doctrine now extend a similar
immunity to work-product produced by a party and a party's agents and insurers,
whether they are lawyers or not. See; e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (work-product
extends to material prepared "by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent)").
41. In New York, the doctrine is found in N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 3101(d)(2)
(McKinney 1991) ("[M]aterials otherwise discoverable ... and prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial ... may be obtained only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial- need of the materials . . . and is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."). For an interesting and recent decision detailing the differences between
the attorney-client privilege and what we are here calling the work-product immunity,
see Spectrum Sys. Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 1991) (stat-
ing that although only "material prepared for litigation" is protected as work-prod-
uct, attorney-client privilege is not tied to contemplation of litigation).
42. Understanding of the work-product immunity has been significantly fur-
thered by the addition of a topic to the Restatement's treatment of client confidenti-
ality, prepared by Professor Linda.S. Mullenix of the University of Texas School of
Law. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, ch. 5, topic 3 (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 1992) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 5]. Among other recent and
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is broadened in two directions.
First, lawyer work-product is broader than the privilege
because it covers not only confidential whispers between client
and lawyer, but much else that is not client-derived. It covers
almost everything that a lawyer might develop and generate in
the course of preparation of a case for litigation-but only
such preparation. For example, similar "work-product" pre-
pared in the course of drafting a will or negotiating an interna-
tional contract is not protected.43 Indeed, although this comes
very close to the line, one case has held that lawyer work in
connection with an ongoing dispute between contracting par-
ties that had not degenerated into a sufficiently focused and
contentious quarrel is not immune as work-product. 44 Theo-
retically interesting arguments could be made for generalizing
the work-product protection to include non-litigation work,
but prevailing U.S. legal doctrine is quite clear that to qualify
as work-product immunized from discovery, material must be
prepared "in anticipation of litigation" as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure describe the limitation.4 5 If material is indeed
protected as work-product, the limited, but important, func-
tion of the doctrine is to bar pre-trial access to the material
through the otherwise broad powers of pretrial discovery.
The second difference between work-product, to the ex-
tent that it protects the trial preparation work of a lawyer, and
the attorney-client privilege, is the significantly lesser degree
to which the work-product must be kept confidential. In gen-
eral, a lawyer may share work-product more broadly than ma-
terial claimed to be privileged. Without threat of loss of the
immunity, a lawyer may show work-product to, and share it
with, persons who are not assisting the lawyer in trial prepara-
tion.46 For example, a lawyer may share work-product widely
within a client's offices, including with those who are not in-
notable works, see generally Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1515 (1991).
43. RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 5, supra note 42, § 136(l)(c) & comments j-m.
44. Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto Indus., Inc.,'709 F.2d 1109, 1121 (7th Cir.
1983).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
46. Doctrinally, this can be seen most clearly in the different articulation of the
more limited circumstances under which disclosure of work-product to a third person
will cause waiver, of the immunity. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 5, supra note 42,
§ 140(4) & comment e, as compared to the much greater vulnerability to loss of the
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volved in trial preparation, so long as the disclosure does not
create a substantial risk of divulgence to an adversary in litiga-
tion.4 7 On the other hand, attorney-client privileged material
will lose that status if it is shown-even if inadvertently
(although negligently), according to several decisions48to
any third person who is not included within the narrow "need
to know" circle of those assisting the lawyer in handling the
client's matter.49 The privilege is based on a pragmatic judg-
ment that confidentiality is necessary in order to encourage cli-
ent communication.50 If the client shows a willingness to share
the privileged communication with non-privileged persons, a
court will feel free to find that, in this instance, the assurance
of confidentiality was not important to the client, and that the
general policy of free access by adversaries to all relevant evi-
dence should prevail.
C. The Agency Law of Confidentiality
The third doctrine provides the greatest breadth in its def-
inition of protected information. It is sometimes called, at the
privilege by similar disclosure to a third party, RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2, supra note
5, § 129 & comment f.
47. RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 5, supra note 42, § 140 comment e ("Work-prod-
uct, including work-product of a lawyer, may be shared freely among the client, the
client's lawyer or other representative, associated lawyers and other professionals
working on the matter, actual or potential co-parties, or a client's business advisers or
agents.").
48. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2, supra note 5, § 129 comment i reporters'
note.
49. The "need to know" shorthand will do for the present brief description of
doctrine, but is not in fact a singular test. Sharing of information within a lawyer's
office, for example, is always privileged, although at least some of that sharing could
not be defended on "need to know" grounds. See id. § 129. On the other hand,
"need to know" is explicitly the doctrine suggested for the sharing of privileged in-
formation within an organizational client. See id. § 123(4)(b). Only roughly captured
by the "need to know" locution are permitted sharings of privileged communications
between co-clients or clients with a common legal interest. See id. §§ 125 (co-clients),
126 (separately represented clients with common legal interest).
50. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (dicta); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1976). See generally CLEARY, supra note 7, § 87; 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE § 2291 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 6.1.
For a criticism of the rationale, relying on arguments drawn from Jeremy Bentham,
see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE 189-92 (1988). The Benthamite argument,
however, relies heavily on what might be overly simplified distinctions between
wrongdoing clients and those in the right. If clients could not readily sort themselves
out in that way, a justifiable need for the privilege would still exist.
1991-1992] CONFIDENTIALITY
risk of some obscurity on the margins, the agency law of confiden-
tiality." The agency rules are discussed in sections 111
through 11 7A and B of the Restatement 52 -the obligations im-
posed on a lawyer not to reveal confidential client information
when doing so would adversely affect the client.5 3 The most
obvious applications of this body of law occur through profes-
sional discipline, for example through disbarment or suspension
of a lawyer's license.54 Professional discipline for breaches of
confidentiality obligations, I should add, is uncommon,
although occasional instances come to light.55 In my experi-
ence, violations (whether prosecuted or not) are also quite un-
common. A client can also gain a damage recovery against the
lawyer who unjustifiably divulged confidential information to
the harm of the client, or possibly, who threatens such divul-
51. See WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 6.1.1.
52. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 111-117B (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1990) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 3].
53. Id. § 111(1) ("The lawyer shall not use or disclose confidential client infor-
mation within the meaning of § 112 about a client if there is a reasonable likelihood
that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of the client or if the client has
directed that the lawyer not use or disclose it ...."). The "reasonable likelihood"
test is elaborated in comment d of section 111 (1) to include whatever uses or disclo-
sures "a lawyer of ordinary prudence would recognize as creating some risk of mate-
rial misfortune, disadvantage, or other prejudice to a client." Id. comment d. None-
theless, and contrary to the position taken in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, com-
ment e of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers would permit a lawyer to use
confidential client information for the lawyer's self-enrichment, so long as strict ap-
plication of the test of comment d concerning the risk of adverse effect to the client is
satisfied. Id. comment e; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1957). Natu-
rally, the position of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers on the matter is con-
troversial.
54. These forms of discipline occur pursuant to confidentiality rules in lawyer
codes that prohibit adverse use or disclosure of confidential client information. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 30, Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rrY DR 4-101(b) (1980). A version of the recommended lawyer code provisions on
confidentiality is in effect in every U.S. jurisdiction. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note
8, § 6.7.2.
55. E.g., In re Gemmer, 566 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 1991) (concerning lawyer sus-
pended, inter alia, for writing to state revenue department informing it of client's
underpayment of tax following falling out between lawyer and client over fees); In re
Pool, 517 N.E.2d 444 (Mass. 1988) (order concerning reinstatement of lawyer dis-
barred for breach of confidence of client by agreeing with prosecutors to tell them
where to find client's hidden safe deposit box if they agreed to let him keep cash
contents of box); In re Rubinstein, 506 N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (involving
lawyer suspended from practice for use of confidential information in insider trading
in shares of law firm's corporate client).
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gence.5 6 Other remedies are being advocated by client liti-
gants. A recent Ohio case, for example, upheld a trial court
order granting an injunction against a lawyer who had gained
confidential information about safety aspects of an off-the-road
vehicle while employed as in-house counsel for an automobile
manufacturer and who, after leaving that position, was adver-
tising his availability as an expert witness for those-who wished
to sue his former client-employer .5  A very recent Penn-
sylvania decision similarly upheld an injunction against a law
firm that secretly began to represent competitors of a former
client in a highly fact-sensitive area of practice.5
Taking this sketch of the U.S. law of confidentiality as a
given, to what extent does it fail to bear out the heroically
broad, absolute-right claims of the U.S. cult of confidentiality?
A complete answer to that question would take us far beyond
the remaining pages. I will list and illustrate only a few aspects
of the answer. I employ in doing so a pale, written imitation of
one version of the U.S. law school classroom exercise in the
Socratic technique, that version at least that relies on hypothet-
ical situations to test and extend an understanding of doctrine.
In that same tradition, I have loosely based several of the hypo-
thetical situations on entirely imaginary versions of an histori-
cal event-the attempted assassination of former U.S. Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan by John Hinckley in 1981.
Hypothetical One: Client rushes into Lawyer's office and
blurts out that Client has just attempted to assassinate the
President. Lawyer responds, "Fear not. Nothing you say
here will leave this office. Tell me everything that hap-
pened. Better yet, write it all down on this legal pad, so I
can retain 'all the details." The police later learn of the
existence of Client's written account and, still searching for
the attempted assassin, seek to compel Lawyer to turn it
over.
56. One much discussed but rarely litigated setting is where a lawyer uses confi-
dential client information to usurp a commercial opportunity of the client. E.g.,
Leach v. Hough, 507 A.2d 848 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
57. American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1991).
58. Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, No. 99 E.D. Appeal
Docket 1990, 1992 Pa. LEXIS 36 (Pa. S. Ct. Jan. 29, 1992). In the interest of full
disclosure, I should indicate that I gave expert testimony in favor of the prevailing
former client during the trial.
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Existing authority strongly suggests that, whatever the
strength of the public need for the information in the lawyer's
hands, the lawyer need not disclose it because of the operation
of the attorney-client privilege and, arguably, the work-prod-
uct doctrine.59 Indeed, disclosure by the lawyer would violate
the agency rule of confidentiality.6" The fact that the at-
tempted assassination of the nation's highest elected official is
involved does make the radical point concerning rights-con-
sciousness, perhaps pressed to some sort of bizarre limit. The
important factor under the privilege, and some limitation on
its social costs, is that the damage is already complete. All that
remains at stake-although it is a great deal-is apprehension
and conviction of the attempted assassin.
Hypothetical Two: In the same office interview, Lawyer
learns from Client that Client used a cheap "Saturday night
special" pistol to do the horrible deed. Client produces the
weapon from a pocket in his coat at this point and hands it
to Lawyer.61 Lawyer puts the gun into an office safe for ex-
amination and possible future use as evidence for the de-
59. A significant issue under the work-product doctrine concerns whether the
anticipation-of-litigation requirement can be satisfied. See supra text accompanying
note 45. The point is purely academic, of course, because the attorney-client privi-
lege supplies a complete bar to an attempt by the police to seize the statement
through mandatory process.
60. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
61. The hypothetical may require some scene-setting. Lawyers trained in other
legal systems are usually appalled by such goings-on in a lawyer's office. U.S. law-
yers, to the contrary, tend to approach such scenes as presumptively legitimate, even
routine. Part of the explanation has to do with guns and their stupidly wide legal
availability in the United States. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Ailing Gun Industry Confronts
Outrage Over Glut of Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, § 1, at 1 (estimating U.S. civil-
ian gun supply at 200 million). More importantly, perhaps, lawyers consider them-
selves as legitimate, first-line investigators of client involvement in both crimes and
civil wrongs.
Gathering and retaining physical evidence, interviewing witnesses, and the like
are considered in the United States important and entirely appropriate parts of a
lawyer's work. In many other legal systems, such activity would be considered to be
entirely impermissible tampering with proof. However, in recent years, even in the
United States, it has become somewhat standard doctrine that a lawyer is under an
obligation to turn over guns and other implements of crime to the prosecuting au-
thorities under the circumstances of the hypothetical. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 164 comment d (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1991) (scheduled to
appear in possibly modified form as Tentative Draft No. 6, 1993). The lawyer none-
theless may retain the weapon long enough to examine it, so long as the examination
does not alter the appearance of the item or affect its utility for the prosecution as
evidence. Id.
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fense at trial. The police later attempt to compel Lawyer to
turn over the pistol for use in prosecuting Client.
The lawyer cannot successfully invoke the attorney-client
privilege to prevent disclosure of the pistol because it is not a
"communication" between the client and the lawyer.
Although the difference may strike some as technical, it
harbors a profoundly important point: the privilege is
designed, not to protect client interests, but to protect client-
lawyer communications. If we stipulate that turning over the
pistol would reveal no client communication, the lawyer may
be required to do so. 62  It is not work-product because the
lawyer's efforts did not lead to its production. Even if, in dif-
ferent circumstances, the lawyer had expended considerable
effort to find the weapon, courts would still hold that it was not
work-product. That result would be reached under the rather
vague doctrine that treats such physical evidence as a "fact"
rather than as work-product.6" The agency rules do prohibit a
lawyer from acting in a manner detrimental to the client's in-
terests in confidentiality of the item, but they are subject to
several exceptions, one of which requires compliance with a
lawful order, such as a subpoena or, if a challenge is made to a
subpoena or similar effort to obtain evidence, a court order
ruling on such a challenge.64 It would be to digress too far to
explain and qualify this description, but almost all the extant
authority goes much further. The general criminal law prohi-
bition against destruction or concealment of evidence may also
require the lawyer to turn the weapon over to the police, even
if the authorities are unaware that the lawyer possesses it and
even in the absence of any effort on their part to obtain it from
the lawyer.65
Hypothetical Three: From another pocket in what must
be a rather full garment, Client pulls a diary. Apparently
Client has been tracking the President for months and has
meticulously recorded such matters as the purchase of the
pistol, routes the President would travel, methods of the Se-
62. See supra note 53.
63. The "fact" qualification to the work-product doctrine is examined in RE-
STATEMENT DRAFT No. 5, supra note 42, § 136 comment g.
64. RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 3, supra note 52, § 115.
65. See supra note 61.
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cret Service in protecting the President, and the like. The
police seek access to the diary.
As strongly intimated by my analysis regarding the
weapon, the diary is a preexisting document that does not it-
self constitute a communication to the lawyer within the mean-
ing of the privilege; therefore it is not protected against com-
pulsory disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.66 It is not
protected as work-product because, again, it was not prepared
by the lawyer in anticipation of litigation 67 and because it is a
fact rather than work-product.6" Also, although agency law
would normally require Lawyer not to reveal the diary, the su-
perior legal interest in law enforcement and the general re-
quirement that a lawyer obey lawful orders even at the expense
of client confidentiality will trump confidentiality interests on
those facts.69
Hypothetical Four: Let me shift focus at this point away
from the drama of assassination attempts to the workaday
world of corporate law practice. Suppose, instead of the
scenario to this point, Client were a large corporation
charged by a governmental agency with violation of an envi-
ronmental regulation. Client's agents have brought to Law-
yer's office several boxes of documents detailing the ways in
which Client Corporation has been disposing of toxic
wastes over the last two decades. The documents are deliv-
ered to the lawyer in strict secrecy and revealing them
would seriously harm Client. Can Lawyer keep them confi-
dential?
Just as with the weapon and diary of the assassin, the pa-
per trail left by a business client is not protected by either the
attorney-client privilege or the work-product immunity and is
thus subject to discovery. Again, the critical fact is that the
documents preexisted the client-lawyer communications.7 °
Unlike the weapon, however, the documents are not contra-
66. On the preexisting-document rule, see generally RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 2,
supra note 5, § 119 comment j. See also, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403-04 (1976).
67. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 63.
69. See supra note 61.
70. The preexisting-document rule is a corollary of the "fact" exception to
work-product immunity. See supra note 63. As already mentioned supra at notes 37-
39, and 66, and accompanying text, the attorney-client privilege is so limited that it
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band or an instrument of crime, and therefore almost certainly
no independent turnover obligation exists. 7' Therefore, the
normal agency rule of client confidentiality applies, 72 and it re-
quires that Lawyer not reveal the documents or produce them
unless and until required by law. In the normal course, we
may be sure, compulsory process to obtain the documents will
be sought by the regulatory agency, so Client Corporation's
respite from mandatory disclosure will probably be brief.
Hypothetical Five: So far we have been dealing with a
lawyering activity that is readily recognizable as litigation in
one form or another-defending a client against a criminal
charge or adversarial regulatory action. Let us shift the fo-
cus to an activity in which many more U.S. lawyers engage-
office practice. Suppose that Client Corporation, wisely an-
ticipating increased regulatory interest that has not yet sur-
faced, calls upon Lawyer to conduct interviews throughout
Client Corporation's enterprise in order to assess possible
exposure to regulatory action. Lawyer conducts extensive
interviews with several employees, makes lengthy descrip-
tions of the interviews in the form of memoranda to the law-
yer's files, and compiles an elaborate report of several hun-
dred pages that Lawyer sends to Client Corporation's se-
nior executives in charge of environmental matters and
overall policy. Several months later, Regulatory Agency
starts a proceeding and, learning of the materials, seeks to
compel Lawyer and Client to produce them.
The lawyer's conversations with Client Corporation's em-
ployees, in many U.S. jurisdictions, are protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. 73 The same is true of Lawyer's extensive
covers only communications between a lawyer and a client initiated as a result of the
lawyer-client relationship.
71. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
73. The basic proposition that the attorney-client privilege applies with respect
to communications between corporate counsel and a corporate client is now univer-
sally accepted by U.S. courts. See generally RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2, supra note 5,
§ 123. Some legal theorists have not been impressed with the arguments for ex-
tending the attorney-client privilege to corporations. E.g., LUBAN, supra note 50, at
217-34; WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 6.5.3. Their skepticism has had no discernible ef-
fect on the shape of the law. The remaining issue of substantial importance is
whether the narrow "control group" test or a broader "subject matter" test (or a
variation thereon) is to be applied. The courts are divided, although the federal
court decisions have strongly favored an approach much like the broader "subject
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report to Client Corporation's senior management."4 The ex-
tensive file memoranda are immune from discovery as lawyer
work-product.7 5
The sweep of that answer may suggest that lawyers might
have a market for their services in running corporations-at
least running corporations that would pay a premium to gain
secrecy. From an opposite direction, several judges and com-
mentators have worried that the corporate attorney-client priv-
ilege creates a "black hole" in corporate counsel's office, into
which a corporation can deposit documents and information
without fear of their later disclosure, with serious conse-
quences for disclosure in trials and for law-compliance inter-
ests generally. 6
At least two considerations probably make the "black
hole" concern largely illusory. First, as we have already seen,
preexisting documents are not subject to either the attorney-
client privilege or the work-product doctrine.77 Thus, for the
scheme to work, the lawyers would have to be part of the pro-
cess of generating the documents. Expense alone would pre-
clude that in most instances. Second, if to overcome that doc-
trinal barrier lawyers become, in effect and at great expense,
central managers of the enterprise, the effort will probably fall
afoul of another doctrinal difficulty. With respect to the privi-
lege, the client-lawyer communications must be made in the
course of the lawyer's providing legal services and not, for ex-
matter" standard. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 2, supra note 5, § 123 comment b &
reporter's note, comment d.
74. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The question of how extensively
an otherwise privileged document may be shared among employees and agents of an
organizational client without waiving the privilege has been little discussed in the
cases. The Restatement proposes a "need-to-know" standard. See RESTATEMENT
DRAvr No. 2, supra note 5, § 123(4); see also id. comment g & reporters' note.
75. RESTATEMENT DRAFT No. 5, supra note 42, § 136(l)(b) & comment h (regard-
ing lawyer-prepared work-product). Indeed, material prepared by a lawyer, such as
the file memoranda in the problem, will often partake of the special character of
mental-impression or "opinion" work-product; discovery of such material through
exceptions is subject to much greater restrictions. See id. § 138 (regarding opinion
work-product).
76. This, for instance, was the concern of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in the Upjohn case, as the Supreme Court noted. See Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (rejecting "zone of silence" argument for narrowing
scope of attorney-client privilege in corporate context).
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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ample, in the course of providing business advice.78 For the
most part, U.S. courts have been strict in applying the require-
ment, and there seems little prospect that the ploy will suc-
ceed. Under the work-product rules, of course, the lawyer's
activities would not be "in anticipation of litigation, '79 and
that basis for refusing to disclose would also fail.
Hypothetical Six: Staying with the corporate client focus,
suppose that what brings a corporate client's manager to
Lawyer's office is a proposed arrangement under which the
client will agree to assure lucrative future employment to a
person who presently heads a government agency that
licenses the activities of the client.
Without putting too fine a point on the matter, the pro-
posed course of action is patently criminal. I raise in this sim-
plistic form the vitally important crime-fraud exception. It op-
erates to limit both the attorney-client privilege 80 and the
work-product immunity.8 ' The vital distinction from Hypo-
thetical One is a completed past act there and, here, a future or
ongoing course of conduct that constitutes a crime or fraud.
One scholar has complained that the breadth of modern regu-
latory law means that much of what might bring a business cli-
ent to a lawyer's office will be excepted from the privilege and
the immunity.82 Courts are unconvinced and have applied the
crime-fraud doctrine with impressive vigor.
What about the agency rule of lawyer confidentiality in
such a setting? Suffice it to say in this brief survey that some
confusion and controversy surrounds the issue. The events in
early 1992 afflicting the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler in New York City is a typical setting. A federal
banking regulatory agency claimed that the law firm violated
federal law by failing to disclose to the agency information nec-
essary in order to permit the agency to do an effective job of
regulation.83 The law firm's predictable response was that any
78. See RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 2, supra note 5, § 118(4); see supra note 37 and
accompanying text (quoting RESTATEMENT).
79. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
80. RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 2, supra note 5, § 132.
81. RESTATEMENT DRAFr No. 5, supra note 42, § 142.
82. David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443 (1986).
83. See In re Fishbein, OTS 92-19 (Dept. Treas., Off. Thrift Supervision, 1992)
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such revelation by them would have violated the agency rule.
Unfortunately for those of us with an academic interest in see-
ing the issue litigated, the case quickly settled. 4 The issue of
disclosing client wrongdoing was, by far, the single most hotly
debated issue in the process of developing what became the
1983 American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. The resulting Model Rule 1.6-on the
agency confidentiality duty and its exceptions-has been the
rule most modified in adopting jurisdictions.8 5 Modifications
have come primarily in the direction of providing for greater
lawyer discretion to disclose in financial-harm cases.8 6 The
Model Rule 1.6 "solution" is itself amorphous and ambiguous
with respect to the very point we are considering-the discre-
tion to disclose ongoing or future crime or fraud that does not
involve death or serious bodily injury.8 7 Dissonance exists be-
tween the black letter of Rule 1.6(a) itself, with its apparently
(Mar. 1, 1992 Notice of Charges against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler and
three partners).
84. On the media attention surrounding the Kaye, Scholer case, see, for exam-
ple, Stephen Labaton, U.S. Moves to Freeze Assets of Law Firm for S. & L. Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at Al; Edward A. Adams, Ripple Effects Seen from Kaye Scholer Suit,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 1992, at 1; Stephen Labaton, Telling on Clients: When Do Lawyers Blow
Whistle? Government Revives Old Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, at D13;Jonathan M.
Moses, Kaye Scholer Defense Team Takes Shape, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1992, at B6; Judge
Declines to Act on Case, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at D6; Stephen Labaton, S. & L. 's
Lawyers Pressured by Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, § 1, at 22; David Margolick, Lawyers
Under Fire with U.S. Willing to Go After Law Firms, More Whistle-Blowing on Clients is Likely,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at Al; Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, How a Big Law
Firm Was Brought to Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al.
The settlement reportedly requires the firm to pay the government banking reg-
ulators US$41 million, including approximately US$16 million that will come from
the firm partners' own pockets, and it requires disbarment of three of the firm's law-
yers (including its former managing partner) from practicing law on behalf of any
federally insured financial institution. See Stephen Labaton, Law Firm Will Pay a $41
Million Fine in Savings Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1992, at Al; see also Rita Henley
Jensen, Firm, OTS Settled At High Cost, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 23, 1992, at 1. Undoubtedly,
some significant stimulus to a settlement was supplied by the government's unprece-
dented freezing of much of the law firm's assets by administrative order at the same
time that it filed the administrative action against the firm, an action which was criti-
cized by several observers. See, e.g., Linda Himelstein, How Thrift Agency Brought Kaye,
Scholer to Its Knees, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 9, 1992, at 1.
85. MODEL RULES, supra note 30, Rule 1.6.
86. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ AP4:103 (2d ed. 1990).
87. Revelation of confidential client information in the case of threatened (and
imminent) death or serious bodily injury is permitted, but not required, under Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1), which permits disclosure "to prevent the client from committing a
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absolute prohibition against client-injuring disclosures,88 and
its comment, with its provision for what lawyers now call a
"noisy withdrawal." 89 The inconsistency between the rule and
its comment produces clumsiness at best, confusion and mis-
understanding at worst. Nonetheless, the ABA House of Dele-
gates recently rejected an attempt by the ABA Ethics Commit-
tee to rewrite the rule in a way that would agree with the com-
ment.90 The then-membership of the Ethics Committee was
contemplating issuing a comprehensive formal opinion to ad-
dress fraud disclosure issues. What the Committee, now under
a new chairman, will do in light of the action of the House of
Delegates is unclear.
CONCLUSION
Closely examining the U.S. law of client confidentiality,
once again we see the difference between listening to rhetoric
and observing what people and institutions do. U.S. legal rhet-
oric about confidentiality-at least public rhetoric-is expan-
sive, grandiose, and one-dimensional, quite misleadingly so.
In fact, the doctrine of client confidentiality is rather deter-
minedly multi-faceted, issue-sensitive, and policy-responsive.
The circumstances, at least in many instances and in general
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substan-
tial bodily harm." MODEL RULES, supra note 30, Rule 1.6(b)(l).
88. Id. Rule 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to represen-
tation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b) .... ).
89. Id. comment (nothing in Model Rules "prevents the lawyer from giving no-
tice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opin-
ion, document, affirmation, or the like").
90. See Henry J. Reske & Don J. DeBenedictis, Ethics Proposals Draw Fire, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1991, at 34; ABA Reects Ancillary Business, Inroads on Client Confidences, 7 ABA/
BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 256 (1991). The rejected propo-
sal of the ABA Ethics Committee would have added the following subsection to the
existing Model Rule 1.6(b) on confidentiality: "A lawyer may reveal such [confiden-
tial client] information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ....
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commis-
sion of which the lawyer's services had been used .... The rationale of many of
those in the ABA House of Delegates who opposed the amendment was that any
statement in the rule of a permission to disclose would be taken to create a duty to do
so. The suit against Kaye, Scholer may, to some observers, give credence to what
otherwise would appear to be an argument based on an improbable assumption of
misuse of a permissive rule.
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form, do seem to make a difference. Superior legal rights of
third persons and society in general do on many occasions
override a client's personal interests in confidentiality, at least
in forming doctrine.
For the most part, we deal here rather plainly not with a
right of confidentiality that has constitutional and thus global
dimensions, but with pragmatic concepts and doctrines
founded on providing practitioners and their clients with the
privacy needed to consult together and to prepare litigation,
but no more privacy as against mandatory disclosure for litiga-
tion than is necessary for the purpose of encouraging consulta-
tion and preparation. For the most part, in my judgment, the
risk of creating black holes is not real; as applied by the courts,
U.S. confidentiality law requires that the lawyer and client have
appropriate attitudes toward legality.
At the same time, the agency rules of confidentiality
broadly prohibit a lawyer from disclosing confidential informa-
tion in all but a few excepted cases. This broad rule, however,
operates independently to frustrate searches for important in-
formation only in a statistically small number of cases. Even in
those instances covered by the rule, I am prepared to trust at
least the great majority of practitioners to avoid assisting cli-
ents in illegal conduct. And the risk that the minority of law-
yers and clients will conspire together, behind a cloak of confi-
dentiality, to frustrate the legal rights of others strikes me, im-
pressionistically, as a lesser social risk than the rather clear
harm that would be produced by significant inroads on the law
of confidentiality as in fact applied.
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